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The Influence of Pension Plan Risk on Equity Risk: A 
Study of FTSE100 Companies – 2002 to 2008 
Summary 
This study has two primary objectives. First, a review of the composition of pension 
funds, incidence of pension scheme deficits and the impact of pension risk, variously 
measured, on equity risk. The latter is based on an econometric analysis of a panel 
data set of FTSE100 companies for the period 2002 to 2008. The primary objective of 
the econometric component is to ascertain whether the equity risk metrics reflect 
pension plan risk. If they do this suggests that with respect to pension plan funding 
equity markets are informationally efficient. On the other hand, if pension risk is not 
accurately reflected equity markets may be viewed as informationally inefficient 
resulting in the underestimation of risk and the resultant overvaluation of firms.  
 
There has been a rebalancing of pension plan assets away from equity and towards 
debt. In 2002 equities contributed 59.83% of total pension fund assets with this 
proportion having declined to 44.16% in 2008. The decline in the share of equity has 
been matched to a significant degree by an increase in the share of debt from 30.52% 
in 2002 to 39.67% in 2008. We suggest that this may in part be due to volatilities in 
equity markets although a further contributing factor may be that recent legislative 
changes have clarified that pension liabilities are a form of corporate debt and that 
available evidence suggest mismatched investment strategies in pension schemes 
reduce shareholder value.   
 
The analysis also suggests that pension plan risk does feed into firm equity risk which 
implies that the market views the assets and liabilities of the company pension scheme 
as part of the assets and liabilities of the firm itself. Having said this, it is also the case 
that there is some sensitivity to both model specification and adjustment techniques. 
More specifically, we note that the measure of pension risk proposed by Jin et al. 
(2006) can result in quite divergent findings influenced by only relatively small 
variations in the assumed value of the systematic risk of pension liabilities. With 
respect to this measure, it was also apparent that the resultant estimate was 
significantly lower than one, raising doubt on the hypothesised 1-to-1 relationship 
between pension risk and capital structure.  
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Section I: Introduction  
The “perfect storm” of negative equity returns and low interest rates in the early years 
of this millennium has resulted in the majority of defined benefit pension schemes 
experiencing a deficit whereby the liabilities of the scheme exceed the assets. This 
situation has been made more obvious by the requirements of FRS17 and IAS19 
which have required companies to disclose such deficits on their balance sheets 
instead of merely mentioning the deficit as a note to the accounts. To place the present 
magnitude of the deficit in context, David Cule, principal at Punter Southall, pointed 
out that the deficit is already "significantly greater than the quantitative easing 
package" and "on a par with the level of support being put together for the 
banking system". 
 
These deficits are debt-like in nature although some differences do exist, a significant 
difficulty being that of measuring the value of future liabilities of the pension fund 
making numerous assumptions regarding, inter alia, wage increases and mortality 
rates within each scheme. Accepting that pension deficits are equivalent to debt then 
there are further implications for estimating aggregate debt and, in turn, corporate 
gearing. Emanating from such implications is a question regarding the perception of 
such deficits by the financial markets in terms of equity returns. In addition, the 
attention of accounting regulators and government legislation has become focussed 
upon defined benefit schemes in an attempt to improve both the transparency of 
disclosure and also protect the interest of scheme members in the event of sponsor 
failure.  
 
According to Lane, Clarke and Peacock (2009) pension deficits for FTSE 100 
companies in July 2009 had reached their highest ever recorded level of £96 billion. 
They ascribe the reason for this as being due to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 and the subsequent sharp decline in assets values. In general, Lane 
Clarke and Peacock (2009) argue that pensions are a key risk for many FTSE100 
companies. Indeed 46 of the 90 FTSE100 companies with defined benefit pension 
schemes reported pensions as either a “principal risk or uncertainty” or a key financial 
risk.  The magnitude of these risks can be illustrated by consideration of the pension 
positions of British Telecom and British Airways. For end 2008, Lane, Clarke and 
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Peacock report that  British Telecom pension liabilities amounted to almost £34.7 
billion (in excess of twice its equity market value) while those of British Airways, 
were £13.5 billion (over five times their equity market value). 
 
This research report strives to investigate the influence of scheme deficits upon 
measures of company risk, in particular systematic equity risk and total equity 
variability. A panel data approach is applied to those FTSE100 companies which 
operated defined benefit schemes during the period 2002-2008  (in 2008, 87 FTSE100 
companies fell into this category). 
 
In Section II we review and synthesize the relevant literature pertaining to defined 
benefit pension schemes in relation to developments in the accounting disclosure and 
pension plan funding and risk. The data set is described in Section III and the 
relationships to be estimated are detailed in Section IV. Section V presents the results 
obtained from the empirical analysis while Section VI concludes.  
 
Section II: Literature 
There are various characteristics of defined benefit pension scheme accounting 
disclosure which may call into question the ability of investors to efficiently process 
and accurately impound relevant information into market values. The rapidly 
changing disclosure regulation accompanied by its relative technical complexity can 
be viewed as an initial major hurdle to surmount, moreover the bulk of the prescribed 
disclosure is currently positioned in footnotes to the accounts rather than more 
prominently on the financial statements. In addition the relatively dramatic impact of 
seemingly minor alterations in the actuarial assumptions critical to the valuation of the 
pension plan assets and liabilities renders intercompany comparisons difficult. 
Furthermore the opportunities for earnings management appear attractive whilst 
flexibility remains regarding, inter alia, the expected return on pension assets and 
ongoing improvements in longevity. The intervention of the Pensions Regulator via 
the Pension Protection Fund provides an incentive for companies to improve the 
funding of their plans and thereby reduce the levies payable. Finally the current 
instability in the financial markets impacting upon equity values, interest rates and 
potentially inflation rates makes any long-term predictions untenable except perhaps 
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that access to defined benefit schemes will continue to narrow as the associated costs 
escalate. 
 
The main stream of research pertinent to our study relates to the extent to which the 
financial markets (both UK and US) are efficient at processing at the complex 
information disclosed in the financial statements compiled on the basis of current 
disclosure requirements. In addition related research which identifies earnings 
management activities surrounding pension disclosure and the extent to which 
analysts and investors see through such behaviour will also be evaluated. 
 
One of the first studies to explore the effect of a firm’s pension deficit on its share 
price was Feldstein and Seligman (1981). Using a sample of 200 US firms they 
concluded that a deficit is rapidly incorporated into the share price suggesting that the 
unfunded pension liability is being recognised by shareholders as equivalent to 
corporate debt. Similarly Bulow, Morck and Summers (1987), using a variable effect 
event study methodology, conclude that unfunded pension liabilities are accurately 
reflected in lower share prices whereas Aldersen and Chen (1987) find that an 
abnormal rise in the share price is experienced by companies which recover a pension 
plan surplus. 
 
Of most direct significance to the current study, Jin et al (2006) examine whether the 
systematic equity risk of 4,500 US companies during the period 1993-1998 reflects 
the risk of their pension plans. Whilst initially suggesting reasons why this may not be 
the case, such as the opaque nature of accounting rules and the existence of the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, their findings are consistent with the capital 
markets exhibiting informational efficiency in processing the pension information. 
However despite this positive conclusion they also suggest that standard cost of 
capital calculations used for capital budgeting do not distinguish between operating 
asset risk and pension plan risk. The outcome is a significant overestimation of the 
discount rate, as much as 30% higher than its true value, thereby leading to the 
rejection of positive net present value projects. Whilst Jin et al are quite positive 
regarding the ability of the equity market to accurately reflect, other studies tend to 
portray rather mixed results regarding the efficiency of the financial markets. 
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Franzoni and Marin (2006), using 36,651 company-years between 1980 and 2002, 
find that the market significantly overvalued firms with severely underfunded pension 
plans. The consequence of this is that such companies earn lower raw and risk 
adjusted stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least five years 
after the first emergence of the underfunding. The explanation provided by the authors 
is that investors are systematically surprised by the negative impact of the pension 
underfunding on earnings and cash flows. 
 
Coronado et al (2008) considered whether investors can look beyond the financial 
statements to identify the economic value of pension assets and liabilities. Extending 
previous research (Coronado and Sharpe (2003)), which focussed on a more benign 
period for defined benefit pension schemes (1993-2001), they investigate the period 
from 2002-2005 when huge variations in pension valuations encouraged increased 
scrutiny from analysts and policyholders. Despite this heightened attention they 
conclude that the equity values of defined benefit sponsoring companies continue to 
inadequately reflect the true economic value of pension assets and liabilities. Instead 
company valuations appear unduly influenced by the accrual reported on the company 
income statement whilst placing little emphasis upon the incremental information 
reported in the footnotes. Although in aggregate the errors estimated are not large they 
can be significant for individual companies. They suggest that ongoing FASB reform 
will result in the migration of key footnote information to the balance sheet. 
 
Picconi (2006) arrives at a similarly pessimistic conclusion regarding the ability of 
investors and analysts to fully process the information available under SFAS87. 
Initially addressing changes in the pension plan parameters which exert a quantifiable 
impact upon future (year-ahead) earnings he suggests that both analysts and the equity 
market only gradually reflect the information. Subsequently taking a longer term 
perspective a similar conclusion is reached in that investors appear unable to properly 
account for both the magnitude of a company’s pension liability and the importance of 
the unfunded liability that has yet to be recognised on the income statement. In other 
words investors fail to fully impound the valuation impact of pension liabilities 
disclosed only in the footnotes. 
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Kiosse et al (2007) examine the measure of pension expense required under SFAS87 
(the GAAP method) together with two alternatives based upon the S&P Core 
Earnings Concept (2002) and another method which substitutes a fair value pension 
expense for the smoothed expense reported under the GAAP method. Their analysis 
suggested that the pension expense as currently reported better captured the market’s 
aggregate valuation of pension costs compared to the S&P method. However when 
the pension cost was disaggregated it was revealed that the unexpected return on 
pension assets included in the fair value specification was significant. Again the 
results emphasise the importance of the information only currently disclosed in 
footnotes. 
 
McKillop and Pogue (2009) examined pension plan risk, variously measured and its 
impact upon both equity risk, variously measured, and debt ratings for FTSE100 
companies over the period 2002 to 2006. Over this period the majority of defined 
benefit pension schemes of FTSE100 companies were in deficit.  In addition, it was 
noted that a trend has been for pension plan assets to marginally shift away from 
equities and towards bonds. In general terms the authors found that for FTSE100 
companies pension plan risk does feed into firm equity and debt risk. This suggests 
that the market views the assets and liabilities of the company pension scheme as part 
of the assets and liabilities of the firm itself.  The authors further note that there is 
some sensitivity to model specification and the adjustment techniques utilised. More 
specifically the measure of pension risk proposed by Jin et al. (2006) can result in 
quite divergent findings influenced by only relatively small variations in the assumed 
value of the systematic risk of pension liabilities.  
 
Section III: Data Overview  
The data for this study is drawn from a number of sources – Moody’s Rating Agency, 
Standard & Poor’s Rating Agency, Worldscope Database, annual reports of FTSE 
companies and London Business School (LBS) Risk Management Service. The 
analysis is carried out for those FTSE100 companies which operate a defined benefit 
pension plan. The analysis is carried out in a panel framework covering the period 
2002 to 2008.  Prior to 2002 few companies provided details of their defined benefit 
schemes in their annual accounts. (Although FRS17 was introduced in November 
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2000 it was not until year end 2002 that its impact reached most balance sheets.) In 
the first year of our sample, 2002, we were only able to obtain full information for 52 
FTSE100 companies thereafter the number reached a peak of 92 in both 2005 and 
2006 before declining to 87 in 2008. 
 
The hypothesis to be tested is that a higher pension plan risk translates into higher 
overall firm risk both in terms of a firm’s equity risk and its corporate debt rating. The 
initial issue to be considered is the measurement of the dependent variable, variously 
defined as either equity risk or corporate debt risk. In the equity risk specification 
three alternate measures are considered. The first, and theoretically most appropriate, 
is that of capital risk structure and is defined as 
 
Capital structure risk E Dβ + =  
[ ]
[ ]E D
Equity E D
E Debt D E D
β β+
+ +
    (1) 
 
The equity beta Eβ  is taken from the LBS Risk Management Service. For a small 
number of companies Eβ  was not available from this source and consequently we 
estimated Eβ  using five years of daily data and employing the Dimson (1979) 
adjustment with one lag and no lead to control for nonsynchronous trading.1
Dβ
 
Following Jin et al. (2006) a value of 0.175 was taken as the beta value for debt  
 
To test the robustness of our empirical results we also report findings based on two 
alternate measures of the dependent variable, they are systematic risk and the variance 
of returns  
 
Systematic risk = Eβ          (2) 
 
Variance of total return = 2Rσ        (3) 
 
                                                 
1 Using this procedure we estimated Eβ for some firms which were already provided by the LBS Risk 
Management Service. Both sets of estimates were very similar.  
9 
 
The key independent variable is that of pension plan risk. We utilise three alternate 
measures. These are 
 
Pension Risk (PR1) = pension liabilities [PL] / (E+ D)    (4) 
 
Pension Risk (PR2) =   
pension assets[ ]PA PL
E D
−
+
     (5) 
 
Pension Risk (PR3) =  PA PL
PA PL
E D E D
β β
−
+ +
      (6) 
 
The first measure is guided by the work of Cardinale (2007) who suggested that UK 
bond market prices reflect corporate pension liabilities and what is important is the 
absolute size of liabilities and not pension deficits. The second is a version of that 
used by Franzoni and Marin (2006), with emphasis in this instance on whether the 
pension fund is in deficit or surplus. The third measure is that used by Jin et al. (2006) 
and links directly to our key measure of equity risk, capital risk structure, (equation 
1). Pension liabilities are taken as reported in terms of FRS17/IAS19 and are the 
projected benefit obligation which represents the actuarial present value of vested and 
nonvested benefits earned by an employee for service rendered to date plus projected 
benefits attributable to salary increase.  The pension assets are represented by the 
contributions made by the sponsoring firm over the life of the defined benefit scheme. 
These contributions tend to be invested in traded assets and are valued at their market 
prices. In the Jin at al. (2006) measure of pension risk the pension assets and liabilities 
are weighted by average systematic risk exposure. The systematic risk exposure from 
pension plan assets average PAβ  is measured by making certain assumptions about the 
beta risk of the various categories of assets (equity, bonds, property, cash and other). 
In Table 2 we provide summary data for the pension plan assets2
β
 allocations for the 
sample companies plus the assumed for the various classes.3
                                                 
2 The Jin et al. (2006) measure of pension risk, which takes account of the structure of the firm’s 
pension assets, may be viewed as particularly appropriate as firms have recently changed their pension 
asset allocation in an attempt to alter the pension plan risk profile (see Table 2). 
3 The various values of 
 It is clear from the 
asset allocations in Table 2 that there has been a rebalancing of pension plan assets 
β draw from work undertaken by the Harvard Management Company (see 
Light (2001)). 
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away from equity and towards debt. At the start of the sample period equities 
contributed 59.83% of total pension fund assets with this proportion falling to 44.16% 
by 2008. The commensurate increase in the share of debt being from 30.52% in 2002 
to 39.67% in 2008. In part this may be due to volatilities in equity markets although a 
further contributing factor may be that recent legislative changes have clarified that 
pension liabilities are a form of corporate debt and that available evidence suggest 
mismatched investment strategies in pension schemes reduce shareholder value.  With 
regard to the systematic risk of pension liabilities PLβ we adopt a similar approach to 
that followed by Jin et al. (2006) although in this instance UK bond data is utilized. 
Monthly closing prices for a 30 year UK treasury bond and the FTSE all-share index 
were employed in a market model regression to estimate a value for PLβ . Using a 60 
month rolling estimate consisting of all monthly returns up to the end of the previous 
year, the in sample estimate of the beta of pension liabilities is about 0.30.  An 
estimate using all 84 months of in-sample data from 2002 to 2008 would come to 
about 0.28.  We display results conditioned on both of these values in addition to the 
upper bound from the previous version of this study, McKillop and Pogue (2010), 
sample period 2002 to 2006 and PLβ  = 0.38. In the empirical analysis we report 
findings on the basis of these three values and it will be noted that our findings are 
quite sensitive to the chosen value of pension liability systematic risk. 
 
Although findings for univariate specifications between the various measures of 
pension and firm risk are presented it is important to assess whether the pension risk 
variable is merely a surrogate for other variables which might impact upon firm risk. 
There are a plethora of studies exploring the equity risk of firms and consequently an 
equally large number of control variables viewed to be important. Young et al. (1991) 
suggest that liquidity and capital intensiveness are of importance. Chan et al. (2001) 
argue that research and development and advertising expenditure have a systematic 
impact upon stock returns. Rosett (2001) highlights the importance of leverage while 
a majority of studies point to the importance of firm size, profitability and growth, 
(see for example, Gombola and Ketz, (1983)). Data for a small number of these 
variables were not available, notably research and development and advertising 
expenditure while others, such as liquidity and capital intensiveness, did not prove 
significant.  
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In Table 3 we present a profile of all the explanatory variables which proved to be of 
importance in at least one of our equity specifications. A correlation matrix is also 
detailed. A key feature of this correlation matrix is that it highlights that the various 
measures of pension risk are strongly correlated.  
 
Section IV: Estimating Relationships 
In this section we derive specifications which link equity risk to pension risk. We 
establish univariate specifications and, drawing from the literature, multivariate 
specifications which include relevant control variables. 
 
For illustrative purposes consider a specification involving our primary measure of 
equity risk, capital structure equation (1), and the linked measure of pension risk 
denoted PR3, equation (6). Following Jin et al. (2006) we define the ‘integrated’ 
company’s balance sheet as: 
 
OA + PA = E + D + PL         (7) 
 
OA is operating assets and the other terms are as before. The company’s financial 
capital (E + D) can then be found by rearranging (7), that is E + D = OA +PA – PL. 
Therefore the company’s capital structure risk can be reworked in the following form  
 
E Dβ + = OAPA PL
OAPA PL
E D E D E D
ββ β
− +
+ + +
       (8) 
 
or E Dβ + = PR3 OA
OA
E D
β
+
+
        (9) 
 
and the estimating equation can then be specified as 
 
E Dβ +  = α + b PR3 +ε                  (10) 
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b represents the sensitivity of firm risk to firm pension risk and α represents the part 
of the expected firm risk that cannot be picked up by the pension risk. The expectation 
is that b is positive and close to one.  
 
Equation 10 is estimated in panel data form with fixed effects at industry level 
controlled for by incorporating a dummy variable for each one-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC).  
 
Petersen (2006) notes that in corporate finance and asset pricing empirical studies, 
researchers are often confronted with panel data where the residuals may be correlated 
across firms or across time4, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, the 
two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. Corporate finance has 
relied on clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1977), while asset pricing has used the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. Petersen (2006) shows that in the presence of an 
unobserved firm effect both OLS and the Fama-MacBeth standard errors are biased 
downward and only clustered standard errors are unbiased as they account for the 
residual dependence created by the firm effect.5
Earlier it was emphasized that it is important to assess, through the introduction of 
control variables (see Table 3), whether pension risk is merely a surrogate of other 
variables which might impact upon firm risk. This point is reinforced through 
examination of equation (9) and the estimating relationship, as given by (10). The 
regression specification only gives an unbiased estimate of the impact of pension risk 
on capital structure risk if operating asset risk is uncorrelated with pension risk. This 
 In the results section we report 
findings using both approaches. As is expected the Fama-MacBeth standard errors 
tend to be generally smaller leading to a marginal improvement in the significance of 
coefficient estimates. 
 
                                                 
4 There are two general forms of dependence which are most common in finance applications. The 
residuals of a given firm may be correlated across years (time series dependence) for a given firm. This 
is called an unobserved firm effect.  Alternatively, the residuals of a given year may be correlated 
across different firms (cross-sectional dependence). This is called an unobserved time effect. 
 
5 The Fama-MacBeth approach to calculating standard errors requires that cross-section regressions are 
run separately for each year, fixed effects at industry level are controlled for using the one-digit SIC 
and then time series averages of both the coefficient estimates and standard errors are calculated. 
Estimation on an individual year basis is not required to calculate Rogers clustered standard errors and 
consequently coefficient estimates using the two approaches are likely to differ marginally. 
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is unlikely to hold because as Jin et al. (2006) note “Much of the risk in the pension 
fund comes from its equity holdings and firm human resource policy, and these are 
potentially highly correlated with the firm’s own operating asset risk.” 
 
Section V: Empirical Findings and Interpretation  
In Tables 4 and 5 empirical findings of various univariate specifications are detailed. 
In Table 4 the Fama-MacBeth methodology is used to compute robust standard errors 
while in Table 5 Rogers clustered standard errors are employed. In broad terms, a 
similar picture emerges from both tables. The coefficient estimates on PR1 (pension 
risk metric derived from Cardinale, 2007) and PR3 (based on Jin et al., 2006) are all 
positive and generally significant indicating that higher levels of pension risk feed 
into higher levels of capital structure risk, systematic risk and return variability. The 
exception to this uniform picture is when PR3 is based on the pension liability upper 
limit PLβ = 0.38.  Again each of the coefficient estimates in Tables 4 and 5 is positive 
but only one of the six prove significant. With respect to PR2 (risk measure derived 
from Franzoni and Marin, 2006) the coefficient estimates are negative as expected, 
although one of the six estimates is not significant. 
 
In Tables 6 and 7 we explore whether the pension risk variable, variously measured, is 
merely a surrogate for other variables which may impact upon company equity risk. 
In both tables all specifications pass the F-test of joint significance of regressors at the 
5 percent level of significance or better. Four control variables proved significant in 
this aspect of the analysis (financial leverage, firm size, firm growth and the return on 
investment). The coefficient estimates on financial leverage, firm growth and the 
return on investment were consistently negative and mostly significant, with the 
incidence of significance more pronounced in Table 6 where standard errors were 
calculated using the Fama- MacBeth methodology. Overall these coefficient estimates 
suggest that FTSE100 companies which were more levered, more profitable and faster 
growing had reduced levels of capital structure risk, systematic risk and return 
variability. The other control variable, firm size, was also negative when the 
dependent variable was either capital structure risk or return variability but positive 
when the dependent variable was systematic risk. In this latter instance the larger the 
FTSE100 company the greater the equityβ .  
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The pension risk estimates in Tables 6 and 7, relative to those in the previous two 
tables are similar in sign, slightly smaller in absolute magnitude and a marginally 
greater number of the pension risk estimates (11 out of 30) are not different from zero 
at acceptable levels of significance. It is also the case that six of the insignificant 
estimates relate to the PR3 metric calculated using the pension liability upper limit 
PLβ = 0.38. This confirms that PLβ  assumptions materially impact upon our findings 
with respect to this risk measure. When the pension liability lower limit, PLβ  = 0.28, 
was used to calculate PR3 the resultant estimates, detailed in Tables 6 and 7, for the 
capital structure risk specification were 0.2741 and 0.3448. This implies that one unit 
of pension risk increases capital structure risk by 0.2741 - 0.3448 units. This is 
decidedly below the earlier hypothesized 1-to-1 relationship. That the coefficient is 
lower than expected may be due to differing and/or opaque actuarial assumptions 
blurring the relationship between pension and firm risk. It may also in part be due to 
the quasi underwriting role provided by the pension protection fund or it may centre 
on accounting practice which now recognizes actuarial gains and losses direct in 
equity and there is deferred taxation on the actuarial gain or loss with this charged 
straight to reserves. 
 
 
Section VI: Concluding Comments  
This study has examined pension plan risk, variously measured and its impact upon 
both equity risk, variously measured, for FTSE100 companies over the period 2002 to 
2008. This period has coincided with the introduction of the pension protection fund, 
greater transparency and standardisation in pension accounting and increased efforts 
to disclose and harmonise actuarial assumptions. Over the period under investigation 
the majority of defined benefit pension schemes of FTSE100 companies have been 
categorised as in deficit.  In addition, it was noted that a trend has been for pension 
plan assets to significantly shift away from equities and towards bonds.  
 
In general terms our analysis also indicates that for FTSE100 companies, over the 
2002 to 2008, period pension plan risk does feed into firm equity risk. This suggests 
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that the market views the assets and liabilities of the company pension scheme as part 
of the assets and liabilities of the firm itself. Having made this point it is also the case 
that there is some sensitivity to model specification and the adjustment techniques 
utilised. More specifically, we note that the measure of pension risk proposed by Jin 
et al. (2006) can result in quite divergent findings influenced by only relatively small 
variations in the assumed value of the systematic risk of pension liabilities. Where the 
correct sign was obtained, with respect to this measure, it was also apparent that the 
resultant estimate was significantly lower than one, raising doubt on the hypothesised 
1-to-1 relationship between pension risk and capital structure. This in turn raises the 
spectre that there may be a weakness in the informational efficiency of equity markets 
which may be caused by shadows cast on the market by the plethora of accounting 
rules and actuarial assumptions.  
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Table 1: Measures of Equity 
Equity Risk (FTSE 100)  
Variable   Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Equity Beta  βE 0.9878 0.3711 0.7000 0.9800 1.2300 
Firm Risk βE(E/E+D)+ βD(D/E+D) 0.7245 0.3096 0.4787 0.7032 0.9283 
Return Variability 
(%) 
σR
2 
27.70 8.77 21.00 26.00 33.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Asset Allocation 
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Assumed 
Asset Class 
Beta 
No. of Firms 52 89 91 92 92 86 87 - 
Equities (%) 59.83 59.50 56.94 57.60 54.73 50.02 44.16 1.000 
Bonds (%) 30.52 30.63 32.44 32.82 35.32 35.80 39.67 0.175 
Property (%) 3.36 2.39 2.48 3.07 3.74 4.06 3.77 0.150 
Other (%) 6.30 7.48 8.14 6.51 6.20 10.12 12.41 0.006 
Total Pension 
Fund Assets (£bn) 
195.44 294.13 326.71 381.07 419.96 382.77 356.50 - 
Total Pension 
Fund Assets As % 
Of Market Cap 
21.88 24.33 24.26 23.95 24.51 24.48 29.20 - 
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Table 3: Independent Variables 
Variable Calculation Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Pension Risk (1) PL
E D+
 
0.3708 0.6649 0.0790 0.1777 0.3908 
Pension Risk (2) ( )PA PL
E D
−
+
 
-0.0277 0.0650 -0.0352 -0.0116 -0.0018 
Pension Risk (3) 
(βPL= 0.28) 
PA PLPA PL
E D E D
β β
−
+ +
 
0.0574 0.0823 0.0084 0.0298 0.0751 
Pension Risk (3) 
(βPL= 0.30) 
PA PLPA PL
E D E D
β β
−
+ +
 
0.0499 0.0707 0.0076 0.0277 0.0681 
Pension Risk (3) 
(βPL= 0.38) 
PA PLPA PL
E D E D
β β
−
+ +
 
0.0325 0.0632 0.0032 0.0169 0.0461 
Financial Leverage 
(FL) 
Debt
TotalAssets
 
26.5186 16.5752 15.0640 25.6950 36.8517 
Growth Rate (GR) 
( )TotalAssetsLog
LaggedTotalAssets
 
0.0446 0.1556 -0.0061 0.0358 0.0742 
Return On 
Investment (ROI) 
NetIncome
TotalAssets
 
0.0522 0.0619 0.0087 0.0427 0.0784 
Firm Size (FS) ( )Log TotalAssets  4.1477 0.6967 3.6849 3.9844 4.4346 
 
 
 PR1 PR2 PR3 
βPL=0.28 
PR3 
βPL=0.30 
PR3 
βPL=0.38 
FL GR ROI FS Beta FR Variability 
PR1 1.0000            
PR2 -
0.6165 1.0000           
PR3 
βPL=0.28 0.6165 
-
0.4792 1.0000          
PR3 
βPL=0.30 0.5383 
-
0.3958 0.9859 1.0000         
PR3 
βPL=0.38 0.3471 
-
0.2781 0.8897 0.8878 1.0000        
FL 
0.0599 
-
0.0329 -0.0195 0.0153 0.0023 1.0000       
GR -
0.1293 0.0945 -0.1277 -0.1191 -0.0739 
-
0.0283 1.0000      
ROI -
0.1381 0.0900 -0.0804 -0.0422 -0.0308 0.0509 
-
0.0594 1.0000     
FS -
0.0333 0.0519 -0.0479 -0.0567 0.0010 
-
0.1709 0.1439 
-
0.3418 1.0000    
Beta 
0.2417 
-
0.0928 0.1228 0.0944 0.0323 
-
0.3000 
-
0.0215 
-
0.2634 0.2410 1.0000   
FR 
0.0741 
-
0.0360 0.1036 0.0874 0.0288 
-
0.4804 
-
0.0559 0.0548 
-
0.1665 0.7704 1.0000  
Variability 
0.3587 
-
0.3657 0.1861 0.1469 0.0289 
-
0.1859 
-
0.1640 
-
0.1520 
-
0.1132 0.4862 0.4598 1.0000 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysisa – Fama-Macbeth Standard Errors 
VARIABLES Firm Risk Equity Beta Variability 
                
PR1 0.1408**     0.2541***     5.1189***     
 0.0454     0.0443     0.6424     
 3.1009     5.7427     7.9687     
 0.0211     0.0012     0.0002     
PR2  -0.6402*     -1.5104**     -42.6535***    
  0.3140     0.4541     9.5706    
  -2.0391     -3.3262     -4.4567    
  0.0876     0.0159     0.0043    
PRβPL0.28   0.6219***     1.0095***     21.1310***   
   0.1483     0.1927     5.1852   
   4.1936     5.2381     4.0753   
   0.0057     0.0019     0.0065   
PRβPL0.30    0.7145***     1.1515***     21.8864***  
    0.1543     0.2305     5.6367  
    4.6295     4.9966     3.8828  
    0.0036     0.0025     0.0081  
PRβPL0.38     0.3842     0.5294*     1.4693 
     0.2770     0.2514     4.7825 
     1.3871     2.1059     0.3072 
     0.2147     0.0798     0.7691 
Constant 0.8836*** 0.8927*** 0.8860*** 0.8853*** 0.8928*** 1.0189*** 1.0308*** 1.0239*** 1.0227*** 1.0358*** 29.9755*** 30.0735*** 29.9385*** 29.9469*** 30.2992*** 
 0.0183 0.0177 0.0198 0.0204 0.0203 0.0243 0.0281 0.0286 0.0300 0.0284 1.2203 1.1980 1.1529 1.1438 1.2076 
 48.2116 50.4110 44.6929 43.4212 43.9878 41.8824 36.7328 35.7802 34.0824 36.4925 24.5645 25.1027 25.9672 26.1811 25.0906 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                
R-squared 0.1948 0.1728 0.1893 0.1941 0.1782 0.3168 0.2477 0.2417 0.2296 0.2110 0.1936 0.1800 0.1262 0.1159 0.0901 
F test 1001.4210 27.9255 65.8294 220.8915 85.0307 4852.9296 530.4328 625.3790 354.6684 1118.4894 136.7233 85.7814 21.1267 260.1648 12.3932 
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0033 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
aCoefficient, Std Error, T-statistic, P-value 
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Table 5: Univariate Analysisb – Rogers Clustered Standard Errors 
VARIABLES Firm Risk Equity Beta Variability 
                
PR1 0.0500     0.1731***     6.1726***     
 0.0307     0.0280     0.8191     
 1.6310     6.1846     7.5363     
 0.1035     0.0000     0.0000     
PR2  -0.0929     -0.8230*     -50.5680***    
  0.3127     0.4540     10.1350    
  -0.2971     -1.8129     -4.9894    
  0.7665     0.0704     0.0000    
PRβPL0.28   0.5086**     0.8989**     24.1679***   
   0.2184     0.3535     9.2062   
   2.3289     2.5433     2.6252   
   0.0202     0.0113     0.0089   
PRβPL0.30    0.5456*     0.9375**     22.1662*  
    0.2878     0.4446     11.5314  
    1.8962     2.1085     1.9222  
    0.0585     0.0355     0.0552  
PRβPL0.38     0.1751     0.3596     1.7076 
     0.3461     0.4853     16.3133 
     0.5057     0.7410     0.1047 
     0.6132     0.4590     0.9167 
Constant 0.8999*** 0.9040*** 0.8944*** 0.8946*** 0.9025*** 1.0406*** 1.0524*** 1.0386*** 1.0394*** 1.0525*** 29.1335*** 29.4310*** 29.1554*** 29.2245*** 29.5842*** 
 0.0453 0.0453 0.0455 0.0455 0.0455 0.0733 0.0758 0.0746 0.0752 0.0745 2.4578 2.4612 2.4236 2.4260 2.4601 
 19.8734 19.9703 19.6349 19.6780 19.8430 14.1886 13.8926 13.9148 13.8209 14.1234 11.8535 11.9579 12.0300 12.0463 12.0256 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                
R-squared 0.1184 0.1085 0.1228 0.1314 0.1088 0.2484 0.1815 0.1948 0.1818 0.1646 0.1537 0.1480 0.0496 0.0345 0.0129 
F test 11.4872 11.1371 11.5743 11.6616 10.9865 19.5969 18.5201 17.0416 14.5422 14.0984 20.9646 8.0362 3.2090 2.1766 1.1336 
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0281 0.3390 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
bCoefficient, Std Error, T-statistic, P-value 
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Table 6: Multivariate Analysisa – Fama-Macbeth Standard Errors 
 
VARIABLES Firm Risk Equity Beta Variability 
                
PR1 0.0951**     0.2181***     4.3591***     
 0.0356     0.0461     0.7686     
 2.6735     4.7310     5.6715     
 0.0369     0.0032     0.0013     
PR2  -0.6004     -1.1908**     -39.6492***    
  0.3521     0.4765     8.8185    
  -1.7052     -2.4991     -4.4961    
  0.1390     0.0466     0.0041    
PRβPL0.28   0.2741*     0.6372**     17.3180***   
   0.1359     0.1974     4.6608   
   2.0174     3.2276     3.7157   
   0.0902     0.0180     0.0099   
PRβPL0.30    0.3417**     0.7369**     17.8930**  
    0.1073     0.2087     4.9094  
    3.1836     3.5315     3.6446  
    0.0190     0.0123     0.0108  
PRβPL0.38     0.1382     0.2034     2.0202 
     0.1414     0.2057     4.2347 
     0.9773     0.9887     0.4771 
     0.3661     0.3610     0.6502 
Financial -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0101*** -0.0097*** -0.0102*** -0.0057*** -0.0056*** -0.0055*** -0.0051*** -0.0057*** -0.1179*** -0.1102** -0.1111** -0.1097** -0.1199*** 
Leverage 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0308 0.0326 0.0323 0.0317 0.0311 
 -16.1028 -20.0343 -16.8545 -16.4683 -16.9967 -7.1039 -9.9544 -7.6365 -7.8821 -8.3925 -3.8261 -3.3771 -3.4408 -3.4561 -3.8574 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0087 0.0149 0.0138 0.0135 0.0084 
Growth -0.2602* -0.3328** -0.3089** -0.2741** -0.3230** -0.2119 -0.4285* -0.4023 -0.3646 -0.4867* -7.1166 -9.5750 -9.6320 -9.4929 -13.2901* 
Rate 0.1107 0.1069 0.1033 0.0980 0.1029 0.1708 0.1863 0.2096 0.2219 0.2256 4.9826 5.5624 5.5773 5.6420 6.6800 
 -2.3502 -3.1116 -2.9915 -2.7976 -3.1379 -1.2401 -2.2997 -1.9194 -1.6433 -2.1568 -1.4283 -1.7214 -1.7270 -1.6825 -1.9895 
 0.0570 0.0208 0.0243 0.0313 0.0201 0.2612 0.0611 0.1033 0.1514 0.0744 0.2031 0.1360 0.1349 0.1435 0.0938 
Firm -0.0808** -0.0802** -0.0834** -0.0694* -0.0824** 0.0689** 0.0705** 0.0670* 0.0811** 0.0714** -2.4372*** -2.3558*** -2.5466*** -2.4507*** -2.1884*** 
Size 0.0258 0.0270 0.0265 0.0296 0.0260 0.0249 0.0259 0.0274 0.0284 0.0269 0.2951 0.2915 0.2561 0.2240 0.2669 
 -3.1358 -2.9743 -3.1413 -2.3461 -3.1725 2.7611 2.7212 2.4405 2.8576 2.6593 -8.2585 -8.0813 -9.9428 -10.9418 -8.1994 
 0.0202 0.0248 0.0200 0.0574 0.0193 0.0328 0.0346 0.0504 0.0289 0.0376 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
Return on -0.8076* -0.8447* -0.8506* -0.8097* -0.8735* -1.5687*** -1.6707*** -1.7250*** -1.7084*** -1.7929*** -24.7944*** -24.2922*** -28.1459*** -28.2736*** -29.6162*** 
Investment 0.3809 0.3947 0.3793 0.3721 0.3897 0.3673 0.4027 0.3877 0.3880 0.4138 3.5652 3.3950 3.6246 3.9757 4.0136 
 -2.1201 -2.1402 -2.2426 -2.1759 -2.2412 -4.2707 -4.1484 -4.4491 -4.4034 -4.3326 -6.9546 -7.1552 -7.7651 -7.1116 -7.3790 
 0.0783 0.0761 0.0661 0.0725 0.0662 0.0053 0.0060 0.0043 0.0046 0.0049 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 
                
Constant 1.4894*** 1.5032*** 1.5110*** 1.4460*** 1.5160*** 1.0272*** 1.0540*** 1.0654*** 1.0030*** 1.0732*** 44.6633*** 44.3316*** 45.4928*** 45.0362*** 44.8344*** 
 0.1020 0.1022 0.1083 0.1165 0.1063 0.1049 0.1045 0.1180 0.1159 0.1143 1.5040 1.5219 1.3313 1.1953 1.0778 
 14.6036 14.7076 13.9535 12.4077 14.2596 9.7939 10.0909 9.0274 8.6570 9.3896 29.6959 29.1295 34.1724 37.6789 41.5972 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                
R-squared 0.5045 0.5001 0.4950 0.4965 0.4901 0.4507 0.4004 0.3900 0.3835 0.3769 0.3165 0.3096 0.2622 0.2521 0.2463 
F test 82.1880 91.0615 22.6468 154.8283 32.0064 241.0236 26.6236 74.4362 197.5750 95.3912 32.9184 134.1238 15.9062 67.6946 17.7342 
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0010 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
aCoefficient, Std Error, T-statistic, P-value 
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysisa – Rogers Clustered Standard Errors 
VARIABLES Firm Risk Equity Beta Variability 
                
PR1 0.0515**     0.1612***     5.6591***     
 0.0250     0.0288     0.7717     
 2.0623     5.6072     7.3332     
 0.0397     0.0000     0.0000     
PR2  -0.1374     -0.6373     -46.2745***    
  0.2918     0.4554     10.1707    
  -0.4709     -1.3992     -4.5498    
  0.6379     0.1623     0.0000    
PRβPL0.28   0.3448     0.6654*     20.7178***   
   0.2112     0.3559     7.3292   
   1.6326     1.8694     2.8268   
   0.1031     0.0621     0.0049   
PRβPL0.30    0.4140     0.7294*     19.0996**  
    0.2611     0.4327     9.4272  
    1.5856     1.6859     2.0260  
    0.1134     0.0924     0.0433  
PRβPL0.38     0.1031     0.1614     2.9569 
     0.2814     0.4541     14.4359 
     0.3665     0.3554     0.2048 
     0.7142     0.7224     0.8378 
Financial -0.0093*** -0.0092*** -0.0091*** -0.0087*** -0.0092*** -0.0051*** -0.0050*** -0.0047*** -0.0044*** -0.0049*** -0.1321*** -0.1246** -0.1222** -0.1207** -0.1369*** 
Leverage 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0478 0.0508 0.0479 0.0477 0.0434 
 -6.9523 -6.8716 -6.6723 -6.5463 -6.6840 -3.7045 -3.5937 -3.2943 -3.1147 -3.3700 -2.7658 -2.4495 -2.5520 -2.5318 -3.1507 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0011 0.0019 0.0008 0.0059 0.0147 0.0110 0.0117 0.0017 
Growth -0.0693 -0.0912* -0.0748 -0.0696 -0.0933* -0.1053** -0.1667*** -0.1482*** -0.1470*** -0.1842*** -5.7837 -7.4294 -8.6384* -9.0387* -10.8710* 
Rate 0.0502 0.0551 0.0485 0.0490 0.0541 0.0470 0.0544 0.0450 0.0445 0.0591 4.3998 4.5706 4.8758 5.0238 5.8656 
 -1.3803 -1.6568 -1.5411 -1.4201 -1.7224 -2.2402 -3.0666 -3.2919 -3.3030 -3.1189 -1.3145 -1.6255 -1.7717 -1.7992 -1.8533 
 0.1681 0.0981 0.1239 0.1562 0.0856 0.0255 0.0023 0.0011 0.0010 0.0019 0.1893 0.1047 0.0771 0.0727 0.0645 
Firm -0.0813** -0.0813* -0.0839** -0.0706 -0.0815** 0.0767* 0.0750* 0.0729* 0.0872** 0.0776* -3.1583*** -3.2098*** -3.2141*** -3.1093*** -2.9129*** 
Size 0.0410 0.0420 0.0405 0.0429 0.0408 0.0407 0.0436 0.0418 0.0430 0.0428 1.0258 1.0570 1.1179 1.1398 1.0871 
 -1.9801 -1.9355 -2.0744 -1.6432 -1.9961 1.8878 1.7214 1.7438 2.0254 1.8124 -3.0788 -3.0368 -2.8753 -2.7280 -2.6794 
 0.0482 0.0535 0.0385 0.1009 0.0464 0.0596 0.0857 0.0818 0.0433 0.0705 0.0022 0.0025 0.0042 0.0066 0.0076 
Return on 0.0606 -0.0004 0.0065 0.0187 -0.0206 -0.6638 -0.8266* -0.8638* -0.8651* -0.9183* -28.8206*** -29.4853*** -35.8412*** -35.3515*** -37.2143*** 
Investment 0.4665 0.4757 0.4637 0.4565 0.4807 0.4204 0.4578 0.4591 0.4616 0.4999 9.7252 9.0296 11.4190 11.8367 12.3640 
 0.1299 -0.0009 0.0141 0.0409 -0.0429 -1.5789 -1.8058 -1.8815 -1.8743 -1.8371 -2.9635 -3.2654 -3.1387 -2.9866 -3.0099 
 0.8967 0.9993 0.9888 0.9674 0.9658 0.1150 0.0715 0.0604 0.0614 0.0667 0.0032 0.0012 0.0018 0.0030 0.0028 
                
Constant 1.3929*** 1.4052*** 1.4039*** 1.3428*** 1.4076*** 0.9174*** 0.9577*** 0.9517*** 0.8901*** 0.9581*** 48.5119*** 49.0965*** 49.6433*** 49.2328*** 49.4468*** 
 0.1783 0.1822 0.1793 0.1859 0.1795 0.1857 0.1945 0.1932 0.1947 0.1941 5.6814 5.6803 6.0788 6.1822 5.9975 
 7.8126 7.7127 7.8280 7.2234 7.8434 4.9410 4.9228 4.9271 4.5711 4.9352 8.5388 8.6432 8.1666 7.9636 8.2445 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                
R-squared 0.3493 0.3395 0.3453 0.3462 0.3376 0.3345 0.2738 0.2797 0.2724 0.2610 0.2484 0.2452 0.1620 0.1462 0.1426 
F test 18.8034 19.2711 19.2649 18.1709 17.7820 19.1903 18.3474 17.0550 15.6126 15.9168 23.1957 10.4714 7.2094 6.0337 5.9948 
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
aCoefficient, Std Errors, T-statistic, P-value 
